Sea-level rise and ensuing permanent coastal inundation will cause spatial shifts in population and economic activity over the next 200 years. Using a highly spatially disaggregated, dynamic model of the world economy that accounts for the dynamics of migration, trade, and innovation, this paper estimates the consequences of probabilistic projections of local sea-level changes under different emissions scenarios. Under an intermediate greenhouse gas concentration trajectory, permanent flooding is projected to reduce global real GDP by an average of 0.19% in present value terms, with welfare declining by 0.24% as people move to places with less attractive amenities. By the year 2200 a projected 1.46% of world population will be displaced. Losses in many coastal localities are more than an order of magnitude larger, with some low-lying urban areas particularly hard hit. When ignoring the dynamic economic adaptation of investment and migration to flooding, the loss in real GDP in 2200 increases from 0.11% to 4.5%. This shows the importance of including dynamic adaptation in future loss models.
Introduction
Many effects of climate change develop gradually over prolonged periods of time. For example, global mean sealevel is currently increasing at a rate of about 3mm per year (Hay et al., 2015) . Under intermediate scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions, the International Panel on Climate Change projects that by the year 2100 the global mean sea level is likely to increase by 0.4 to 0.7 meters compared to the period 1986-2005 (Church et al., 2013 ).
In addition to being gradual and prolonged, many effects of climate change are heterogeneous across space. Rising oceans bode ill for many large coastal cities, such as Amsterdam, Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City, whereas inland cities, such as Mexico City, Dallas or Kinshasa, will be untouched by the direct effects of sea level rise.
Understanding these spatial and temporal dimensions is essential to any economic evaluation of climate change.
In particular, permanent coastal flooding will shift the spatial distribution of economic activity to more inland regions.
1 Moving the centers of economic production to the interior is certainly possible, since land is still a relatively abundant resource, as reflected by 90% of world GDP being produced on 10% of land (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015) . However, the feasibility of relocation does not necessarily make it easy or costless. Natural, economic, and institutional barriers to moving people and goods abound. While relocating to higher ground should be relatively straightforward in the United States, it is harder in the Netherlands and close to impossible for small Pacific islands.
Of course, the cost of changing the spatial distribution of economic activity is likely to be somewhat mitigated as long as sea-level rise occurs gradually over time. Faced with a slow-moving process of rising oceans, the required geographic relocation of people and economic activity over any short horizon is limited. The gradual nature of this process also implies that any substantial rise in sea level takes longer to materialize than the standard time it takes for capital and infrastructure to depreciate. As a result, the cost of capital destruction due to the permanent rise in sea level is likely to be relatively small. Much more important than the loss in structures per se may be the loss of local agglomeration economies that come with density. Intuitively, flooding Manhattan is costly because of the technology and agglomeration economies lost. Manhattan's buildings are valuable primarily because of where they are, not because of the cost of rebuilding them.
In addition to the static cost of relocating people and the static impact on agglomeration economies, there are also important dynamic growth effects associated with changing the spatial distribution of economic activity.
Depending on whether the partial abandonment of Ho Chi Minh City due to permanent inundation leads to the spatial dispersion of economic activity or to the emergence of new clusters, productivity and innovation will be affected differently. To assess the growth effects of coastal flooding, we therefore need to account for the entire economic geography of the world, as some clusters may disappear while others come into being. These growth effects play out both at the local and the aggregate level. Ultimately, if sea-level rise destroys coastal high-density clusters, without new ones appearing in other places, global growth may suffer.
The above discussion suggests that a comprehensive economic evaluation of climate change in general, and coastal flooding in particular, should focus on (i) quantifying the costs associated with changing the spatial distribution of economic activity, (ii) analyzing the dynamic spatial response at a high spatial resolution, (iii) embedding this high-resolution analysis in a global general equilibrium framework, and (iv) incorporating static and dynamic agglomeration economies when estimating the effects of the destruction of existing economic clusters and the emergence of new ones.
Incorporating these considerations into an evaluation of the effects of sea-level rise requires a change in focus, 1 Throughout the paper, we use the term flooding to indicate permanent inundation and not episodic, temporary, flooding.
from computing the value of destroyed land and structures, to evaluating the dynamic changes in the location of economic activity. To do so, we need a high-resolution global dynamic equilibrium framework that is able to analyze the effects of permanent inundation on both the places that suffer directly from the rise in sea level and the rest of the world economy. In such a model, dynamics are crucial if we want to evaluate how different localities are likely to evolve. Assessing how the economy reacts to flooding also requires realistically modeling the economic links between locations, in particular the trade of goods and the migration of people. Desmet, et al. (2018) propose and quantify a model of the world economy at a 1
• by 1
• resolution that incorporates these elements, except for the impact of sea-level rise. Rather than focusing on investment in capital, the model emphasizes investment in local technology. In doing so, it explicitly models the effect of static and dynamic agglomeration economies on productivity and growth. Our paper uses the benchmark economic scenario in Desmet et al. (2018) and incorporates probabilistic sea-level rise projections for different greenhouse gas emissions scenarios constructed by Kopp et al. (2014) and Kopp et al. (2017) for the period 2000 to 2200. Using many realizations of sea-level paths, we analyze which areas become permanently submerged over time and compute economic scenarios in which people cannot live or produce in flooded areas. This exercise yields average predicted costs of flooding in all areas of the world over time, as well as confidence bands for these costs, which depend on the severity of the realized flooding paths. We measure these costs in terms of an individual's real income and in terms of her welfare; the latter measure also takes into account local amenities and an individual's idiosyncratic preferences for a location.
Our evaluation of the effects of permanent coastal inundation emphasizes economic adaptation. Hence, in our analysis we take sea-level rise projections to be exogenous to the evolution of the economy and ignore other adaptation efforts aimed directly at reducing flooding. 2 The novelty of our approach lies in incorporating endogenous economic adaptation to flooding through migration, trade, and local investments in technology. Our assessment quantifies the costs of flooding relative to a counterfactual scenario where sea levels remain constant; these costs can then be combined with cost estimates of flood mitigation and other forms of physical adaptation to properly evaluate different policy options.
Under an intermediate scenario of greenhouse gas emissions, we project that sea-level rise will lead to a drop in global real GDP of 0.19% in present discounted value terms (with a 95% credible interval of 0.07 -0.37%) and a displacement of 1.46% of world population in 2200 (with a 95% credible interval of 0.15 -3.54%). The spatial variation in these effects is large: some countries, such as Vietnam, lose more than 7% of real GDP, and some coastal cities, such as Bangkok and Shanghai, lose an important share of their population. These magnitudes would be significantly larger if we ignored the dynamic spatial adjustment of the economy to sea-level rise. If people were immobile when faced with rising oceans (or unable to move far from inundated areas), the real GDP loss in the year 2200 would be 4.5%, compared to 0.11% in our benchmark model. When not taking into account the spatial dynamic reaction of the economy, our quantitative findings are in the same ballpark as those of Nicholls and Tol (2006) and Hinkel et al. (2014) . We quantitatively show that these insights are unchanged in an extension that includes the losses in physical residential capital for the particular case of the U.S. Although damage to physical structures adds to the overall cost of flooding, its impact is minimal compared to the mitigating effects from the dynamic spatial adjustment of the economy. This confirms our intuition that, in relative terms, the cost of lost capital is minor since inundation evolves slowly, capital depreciates, and individuals discount the future.
Existing evaluations of sea-level rise mostly fail to account for the geographic evolution of the world economy, and in particular for its spatial dynamic reaction to flooding. In its simplest form, assessing the costs of sea-level rise is often done on the basis of today's economy (Dasgupta et al., 2007) . This overlooks that the spatial distribution of the world economy will change over the coming centuries. It also ignores that people will move when their land becomes inundated, and that their migration will affect existing and future clusters of population, economic activity and innovation. Some researchers incorporate static projections of the changing future distribution of population and economic activity into their analysis by using different socio-economic scenarios, such as 
A Dynamic Spatial Model
Our dynamic spatial model of the economy follows that of Desmet et al. (2018) , with two differences. First, because of future flooding, the amount of available land in each location will be time-dependent. Second, there is uncertainty about the future global and local sea-level rise. When presenting the model, we do so for one particular path of sea-level rise. In the simulations, we will solve the model for many different paths, so we can analyze the uncertainty faced by the world economy as it moves forward. As we will make clear below, individual and firm decisions are directly affected by the realized path, but not by the uncertainty around the severity of the realized flooding scenario.
Endowments and preferences
The world economy occupies a two-dimensional surface S, where a location is defined as a point r ∈ S. The surface S is partitioned into C countries. Location r has land density H t (r) which is time-dependent because of sea-level rise. There areL agents in the world economy, each supplying one unit of labor. 3 An agent derives utility from local amenities and from the consumption of a set of differentiated products. Utility is further affected by an agent's idiosyncratic locational preferences and by the moving costs from having resided in different places in the past. More precisely, the period utility of agent i who resides in r in period t and who lived in locations r − = (r 0 , ..., r t−1 ) in the previous periods is
where a t (r) are the local amenities, c ω t (r) is the consumption of variety ω, 1/(1 − ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties, ε i t (r) is a location preference shock drawn from a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter 1/Ω, and m (r s−1 , r s ) is the cost of moving from r s−1 in period s − 1 to r s in period s. Local amenities take the form a t (r) = a (r) L t (r)
−λ , where a (r) can be thought of as a location's exogenous amenity, and L t (r)
represents the negative effect of population per land, L t (r) , on amenities. A higher value of λ means more congestion from amenities; this acts as a geographic dispersion force. A greater value of Ω implies more dispersion in agents' tastes across locations; this acts as a second geographic dispersion force. An agent earns income from work, w t (r) , and from the local ownership of land, R t (r) /L t (r). Agents discount the future at rate β
We assume that the mobility cost of moving from r to s is the product of an origin-specific cost, m 1 (r), and a destination-specific cost, m 2 (s). In addition, we also assume that staying in the same location is costless. Taken together, this means that m (r, s) = m 1 (r) m 2 (s) and m (r, r) = 1 for all r, s ∈ S. Because m (r, r) = 1 implies that m 2 (r) = m 1 (r) −1 , the permanent utility flow cost of entering a location is compensated by a permanent utility flow benefit when leaving that location. As a result, agents only pay the flow cost of having entered s while residing in s. For example, if an agent migrates from Mexico to the U.S., and later returns to Mexico or moves to a third country, she only pays the utility flow cost of having entered the U.S. while living in the U.S. As shown by Desmet et al. (2018) , this implies that an agent's dynamic location decision simplifies to a sequence of static decisions. This formulation is what ultimately makes the model computationally tractable. 
Technology
Production per unit of land of a firm producing good ω depends on the amount of labor per unit of land hired,
, and the level of total factor productivity (TFP),
where φ ω t (r) denotes how much a firm innovates and z ω t (r) is a random productivity draw. Because land is a fixed factor, it causes congestion. A higher value of 1 − µ implies more congestion; this constitutes a third geographic dispersion force. Innovating an amount φ ω t (r) requires a fixed labor cost νφ ω t (r) ξ . Because innovation is local, it creates a local advantage to scale; this constitutes an agglomeration force. The strength of this force is increasing in the returns to innovation, as captured by γ 1 /ξ. In addition to how much it innovates, a firm's TFP also depends on the realization of a random variable, z ω t (r), drawn from a Fréchet distribution
where T t (r) = τ t (r) L t (r) α and
where η (r, s) is such that S η (r, s) dr = 1. 5 This specification implies that the average draw is increasing in population density, past innovation, and past productivity in the own location and in the rest of the economy. The positive effect of population density on the average draw introduces a second agglomeration force. Given that there is more scope for this effect when there is greater dispersion in draws across locations, this agglomeration force is increasing in α/θ. The importance of past innovation introduces inter-temporal spillovers, and guarantees that the economy does not stagnate in the long run. In addition to the two static agglomeration forces mentioned before, these inter-temporal spillovers introduce an additional dynamic agglomeration force. High-density locations that have innovated in the past continue to be productive today. This attracts more people, increases market size, and so makes them good places to continue innovating today. The role of past productivity in the rest of the economy in determining a location's average draw ensures that this dynamic agglomeration force does not lead the economy to concentrate over time in one place. As such, the dynamic agglomeration force will be increasing in γ 1 /(ξ(1 − γ 2 )).
Productivity draws are correlated across space, with that correlation going to one when the distance goes to zero. This, together with the fact that the cost of innovation is per unit of land, implies that in any small interval there is a continuum of firms that compete in prices. These firms bid for land to the point of making zero profits net of the fixed innovation cost. To the extent that innovating allows firms to offer a higher bid for land in a particular location, firms will innovate. Our specification of technology in equation (3) implies that any innovation in location r in period t becomes available to all potential entrants in location r in period t + 1. As in Desmet and
Rossi-Hansberg (2014), the firm's dynamic innovation decision therefore simplifies to a sequence of static decisions.
Hence, after learning their common local productivity draw, a potential firm in r maximizes current profits,
where p ω t (r, r) is the price charged by the firm of a good sold at r. If we denote the iceberg cost of transporting a good from r to s by ς (s, r) ≥ 1, then the price of a good ω, produced in r and sold in s can be written as
Prices, export shares and trade balance
Because firms are subject to perfect competition, it is easy to see that in any r ∈ S we have L ω t (r) and φ ω t (r) being identical across goods ω. That is, if one of the goods gets a better productivity draw, z ω t (r), it will simply sell at a proportionately lower price p ω t (r, r), leaving the maximization problem above unchanged. This allows us to write the price of a good produced at r and sold at s as
where the second equality defines mc t (r) implicitly. The expression (4) is similar to the one in Eaton and Kortum (2002) : the price is inversely proportional to z ω t (r) and proportional to a term that captures the marginal input cost. Importantly, that marginal input cost term is exogenous from the point of view of the individual firm, so that productivity draws affect prices without changing the input cost.
This result allows us to apply many of the results of Eaton and Kortum (2002) . In particular, the probability density that a good produced in r is bought in s is given by
and the price index of a location s is
We assume that trade balance holds location by location, so that
Equilibrium: existence and uniqueness
The conditions above define a dynamic competitive equilibrium of this economy that can be reduced to a system of equations that determines wages, employment levels, and utility in all locations. In particular, for any t and for
and H t (·), the model determines the equilibrium wage, w t (·), population density, L t (·), and utility, u t (·) . Desmet et al. (2018) show that a dynamic competitive equilibrium exists and is unique if
This condition essentially states that the static agglomeration forces must be less strong than congestion forces.
The left-hand side consists of agglomeration forces from getting better draws in more dense places (α/θ), and from spreading the innovation cost over more units in more dense places (γ 1 /ξ). The right-hand side consists of congestion from amenities (λ), land (1 − µ) and taste heterogeneity (Ω). The intuition for this condition is that if congestion is stronger than agglomeration, we get rid of possible multiplicities common to many economic geography models.
Balanced growth path
In a balanced growth path (BGP) the spatial distribution of employment is constant and all locations grow at the same rate. Desmet et al. (2018) show that a unique balanced growth path exists if
This condition is similar, but stronger, than the condition for uniqueness. In particular, the left-hand side now includes an extra term reflecting the dynamic part of agglomeration economies. If dynamic agglomeration forces are too strong, it leads the economy to eventually concentrate in one location. For example, if 1−γ 2 = 0, the above condition (7) no longer holds. Innovations cease to diffuse to the rest of the economy, and the economy would increasingly concentrate in the most productive location. In the balanced growth path, aggregate real consumption can be shown to grow according to
As a result, the BGP growth rate depends on the spatial distribution of population.
In all simulations presented below, conditions (6) and (7) are always satisfied. Because the current calibrated world economy is not at the balanced growth path, its spatial distribution changes over time, even in the absence of flooding. During this transition to the balanced growth path, the world growth rate also varies over time. Of course, once we add flooding, the dynamics of the world economy also varies due to the progressive inundation of some of the available land.
3 Quantification, Calibration and Flooding Scenarios
Data and calibration
The quantification of the model follows closely Desmet et al. (2018) . Here, we describe briefly its main features but refer to that paper for a more thorough description. We discretize the world into 64,800 1
values are partly taken from the literature and partly estimated from data as described below. Our quantification identifies initial productivity and amenities by cell, as well as bilateral cell-to-cell transport and migration costs.
Main parameter values. The parameter values, reported in Table 1 , come from the baseline simulation in growth and the spatial distribution of population in (8) . 6 In particular, after taking logs and discretizing space, we can rewrite (8) for country c as log
, where S c is the two-dimensional surface occupied by country c. By estimating this equation, we can recover γ 1 and γ 2 because they are functions of α 2 and α 3 . As for the innovation cost parameter ν, we set it at a level that matches a 2% growth rate of real GDP in the initial period.
Trade costs. We assume that the cost of passing through a cell is given by log ς (r) = log ς rail rail (r) + log ς no rail [1 − rail (r)] + log ς major road major road (r) + log ς other road other road (r) + log ς no road [1 − major road (r) − other road (r)] + log ς water water (r) + log ς no water [1 − water (r)]
where rail (r) equals one if there is a railroad passing through r and zero otherwise, major road (r) equals one if there is a major road passing through r and zero otherwise, other road (r) equals one if there is some other road passing through r and zero otherwise, and water (r) equals one if there is a major water route at r and zero otherwise. The values of the cost parameters ς rail , ς no rail , ς major road , ς other road , ς no road , ς water and ς no water come from Allen and Arkolakis (2014), and the data on the presence of roads, water routes and railroads in each grid cell come from http://www.naturalearthdata.com/. With ς (r) in hand for each cell, we use Gabriel Peyre's Fast Marching Toolbox for Matlab to compute the lowest cost to go from r to s, ς (r,
where g(r,s) ς (u) du denotes the line integral of ς (·) along the path g (r, s). To calibrate Υ, we run a gravity equation regression on trade data simulated by the model for the initial period, and search for the value of Υ that matches the elasticity of bilateral trade flows to distance as measured by Head and Mayer (2014) .
Local amenities and initial productivity. To simulate the model, we need measures of the spatial distribution of amenities, a (r), and initial productivity, τ 0 (r). Using data on land H 0 (r) from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, as well as population L 0 (r) and wages w 0 (r) as measured by GDP per capita in 2000 (period 0) from the G-Econ 4.0 database, we can uniquely recover the distributions of τ 0 (r) and a (r) /u 0 (r).
To disentangle a location's amenity, a (r), from its initial utility, u 0 (r), we use data on subjective well-being from the Gallup World Poll (Gallup, 2012) . Subjective well-being, denoted byǔ 0 (r), is measured on a ten-step scale, going from the worst possible life and to the best possible life. Deaton and Stone (2013) show that this measure depends linearly on the log of real income, whereas in our model utility depends linearly on the level of real income.
Hence, the relation between utility as defined in our model, u 0 (r), and utility as defined by subjective well-being, u 0 (r), can be written as u 0 (r) = e ψǔ0(r) . Based on estimates from Deaton and Stone (2013), we set ψ = 1.8 and use data on subjective well-being to get estimates of u 0 (r). Since we already have measures for a (r) /u 0 (r), this allows us to obtain estimates for a (r).
Migration costs. We estimate the cost of migrating in and out of each location so that the model matches the 
Simulation
Once we have estimates for all the parameters, the migration and trade costs, and the initial distributions of technology, amenities and land, we can simulate the model forward for the years 2000 to 2200. Every period we update the spatial distribution of technology given local innovations, we account for the amount of land lost to flooding, and then solve for the distribution of population and welfare. As shown by Desmet et al. (2018) , the model can be solved by a simple iterative procedure.
Flooding scenarios
To incorporate the flooding of land in every period, we rely on probabilistic sea-level rise (SLR) projections by Kopp et al. (2014) for the global mean and for local relative SLR at 1,091 tide-gauge sites around the world from 2000 to 2200. Note that sea level does not change uniformly across space, due to differences in, among others, ocean dynamics and tectonics. For example, because of high subsidence, Galveston, Texas, is predicted to experience SLR close to double the average rate, whereas because of solid earth responses to regional glacial mass loss, Juneau, Alaska, is predicted to experience a drop in sea level. To compute how much land gets flooded, for each grid cell we combine the estimated SLR with topographic data.
To that end, we primarily employ Climate Central's CoastalDEM ( . In Appendix C we assess the sensitivity of our results to only using AW3D30.
We convert elevations to reference local mean higher high water levels (MHHW), corresponding roughly to local high tide lines, to be used as the baseline for adding sea level projections and then estimating inundated land. We For each time period t and each 1
• grid cell r, we take the corresponding water height from each of the 40 stratified GSML paths to determine H t (r), the proportion of land in the grid cell that is not inundated.
Low-lying regions isolated from the ocean by high ridges are removed using connected components analysis and are not included in these calculations.
Global Effects
In this section we examine the global effects of sea-level rise, focusing on real GDP and welfare losses, as well as on the displacement of population. We start by showing time paths of these effects, and then estimate the present discounted value of future losses. Given the uncertainty about sea-level rise, all our estimates come accompanied by credible intervals. The key contribution of our model is to incorporate the spatial dynamic reaction of the world economy to future flooding. To quantify how this form of economic adaptation matters for our results, we compare our findings with more naive models that do not account for this type of adjustment. Table 2 show the share of the world population displaced by flooding. The mean share displaced increases monotonically over time and reaches 0.58% in 2100 and 1.46% in 2200 under RCP 4.5 (Table 2 ). In the more extreme emissions scenario RCP 8.5, the mean share of population displaced rises to 2.25% in 2200. Percentage of population displaced refers to the sum of differences in absolute value of cell population under no flooding scenario and cell population under the mean flooding scenario divided by twice the total population. 
Time paths of global losses and population displacement

Present discounted value of future losses
In addition to examining the time series of losses, we also compute the expected present discounted value of future losses. All present-value calculations reflect the period 2000 to 2200 for the three different emissions pathways.
Using a 4% annual discount rate, Table 3 reports how much higher the present discounted value of real GDP is under no flooding relative to the mean under flooding (see Appendix B.1 for alternative discount rates). 9 For the moderate-emissions RCP 4.5, the expected present-value loss of world real GDP per capita due to flooding is 0.19%
(95% credible interval of 0.07% -0.37%). Across scenarios, the expected present-value losses range from 0.16%
(95% credible interval of 0.07% -0.33%) under RCP 2.6 to 0.25% (0.12% -0.44%) under RCP 8.5. Turning to welfare, 
Heterogeneity in GMSL rise
To further analyze the impact of flooding, Figure 2 and 0.3%. That, is depending on the spatial and temporal characteristics of the path we can have effects that are 50% larger. The variation of the fraction of displaced population for a given GMSL rise is even larger. An increase of 0.8m in GMSL can yield displaced populations that go from 0.5% to 1.0%; the displaced population estimates for a given GMSL can differ by 100% due to the dynamics and local variation of the paths. 
The importance of economic adaptation
Compared to the existing literature, an essential contribution of our model is that it takes into account economic adaptation: the dynamic and spatial reaction of the economy to flooding. For example, if rising sea-level leads to Ho Chi Minh City becoming inundated, its population will move elsewhere. This will change the geographic distribution of population, thus affecting the incentives for innovation in different locations. As a result, it will put the economy on a different dynamic spatial path.
To assess the importance of incorporating the dynamic spatial reaction of the economy, we compare the quantitative predictions of our model to the predictions of alternative evaluations that abstract partially or completely from economic adaptation. To that end, we consider a number of simplified assessments of sea-level rise. A first assessment estimates the losses of flooding, without taking into account the possibility of moving. That is, for each year t, we take our model's predictions in the absence of flooding, and compute which fraction of world population, GDP and world welfare gets flooded using the median GMSL rise projection under RCP 4.5 for that year. We refer to the population that lives in these regions as "flooded" and compare it to the population displaced in our baseline evaluation. Because this approach does not allow people to move when faced with flooding, in Figure 3 we refer to it as the "no adaptation (naive)" model.
As can be seen in Figure 3(b) , the percentage of population that gets "flooded" in 2200 increases to ∼ 1.65% from a fraction of displaced population in our baseline case of ∼ 1.45%. 10 The effect on real GDP losses for the year 2200 is substantially larger, increasing from 0.11% in the benchmark model to ∼ 4.5% in the no adaptation naive model (Figure 3(a) ). This much larger loss is due to two effects that are ignored in the naive model. First, .) The difference with the naive model is simply that we are not assuming such migration costs are always and everywhere infinite. Second, when people move to other places, this leads to growing spatial concentration in these places, and hence to greater incentives to innovate in these newly emerging clusters. Both effects help to mitigate the negative effect of sea-level rise. Hence, ignoring these effects leads to much greater estimated losses from flooding.
To understand the differential impact of both effects, we consider a second alternative evaluation where we allow people to move when faced with permanent inundation, but we do not allow this to affect firms' incentives to innovate. That is, location-specific productivity is not affected by people moving due to flooding, but we do take into account that people who move away from flooded areas add to real GDP in the places where they settle.
In Figure 3 we refer to this case as the "no adaptation (static equilibrium)". In this alternative setup, loss in real GDP in 2200 is around 1.5%. As expected, this loss is greater than in the full-blown model that incorporates changes in the incentives to innovate, but less than in the naive model that does not allow people to move.
To complete our comparison, we contrast our findings to a third alternative evaluation where we take today's geographic distribution of economic activity and keep it unchanged over time. This is the simplest possible form of evaluation, and is akin to the accounting exercise in Dasgupta et al. (2007) . We simply use the GMSL rise projection for each year t, and estimate which part of real GDP is lost and which part of the population is flooded, based on today's data. In Figure 3 we refer to this case as the "no adaptation (fixed population)" model. Compared to the naive model, where losses are also calculated without taking into account people's reallocation as a result of flooding but the economy evolves spatially over time, we find smaller losses in real GDP and population "flooded".
This is consistent with the spatial dynamic model predicting coastal areas becoming relatively more productive over time, and harboring an ever greater share of world population.
From these comparisons we conclude that incorporating the spatial dynamic adjustment of the economy is key to quantitatively assessing the economic impact of sea-level rise. In spite of migration being costly, the possibility of moving and the dynamic effects of the spatial reallocation of economic activity lead to a significant decrease in the real GDP loss from flooding. We see a similar, though somewhat smaller, mitigating effect on welfare losses (Figure 3(c) ). However, even for welfare the effect of flooding is more than five times larger in the naive evaluation than in our baseline. These results also imply that the cost of coastal flooding depends crucially on the size of migration costs. Higher costs due to, for example, more restrictive migration laws would increase the cost of coastal flooding significantly.
Local, Country and City Effects
The global economic effects of SLR mask heterogeneous local effects. Some regions suffer dramatically from inundation, while others experience economic gains. When presenting real output and welfare outcomes at the local level, we face the decision whether to focus on total local real GDP and welfare, which are directly affected by the number of people in a given region, or on per capita outcomes, which are not. The former is helpful to illustrate that some areas not only experience a decline in the average well-being of their residents, but also become relatively empty by losing population. In what follows we will discuss both total and per capita outcomes. We analyze these effects at the cell level, the country level and the city level. Figure 4 displays a world map of the mean loss in total real GDP across realizations in the year 2200. As expected, coastal areas suffer significant losses across the globe, but the effects are unevenly distributed. The negative effects tend to be larger in Southeast Asia and Northwest Europe, while they are more contained on the Pacific coast of the Americas. Flooding also affects areas that are not directly impacted by the sea-level rise. In particular, in the year 2200, inland regions tend to gain around 1.5% of GDP. These results underscore the importance of our spatially disaggregated general equilibrium analysis: focusing only on flooded areas would ignore this redistribution. In present discounted value terms, around 20% of coastal cells lose. In contrast, almost all inland cells gain (see 
Cell-level effects
Country-level effects
We further illustrate our findings by looking at the fate of some particular countries. Appendix A presents, as examples, the evolution of real GDP and welfare for China and the U.S. The figures show that China and the U.S. experience a similar evolution of welfare costs but the losses in GDP per capita are larger and are much more persistent in China. In Table A1 in Appendix A, we also present losses in real GDP, welfare and population for most countries in the world. For example, China's loss in real GDP per capita due to permanent inundation 11 It loses more from flooding than most other countries, with total real GDP declining 0.41% and the welfare in the country dropping 1.05% in present discounted value terms. The country loses 3.0% of its population in 2200, and as a result economic activity declines.
City-level effects
Coastal flooding is bound to have an important effect on many of the world's largest cities. Table 4 its population when using a 95% credible interval. Appendix C Table C1 reports estimates for alternative sea-level rise projections and alternative elevation maps.
Physical Structures
Our model does not include physical structures. We have argued that the losses of physical structures due to sea-level rise are likely to be relatively minor for two reasons. First, sea-level rise is a slow-moving process, and the 11 In our simulations the Netherlands inundates immediately since we do not consider existing dikes or other forms of protection against inundation. As mentioned before, the numbers we find should be compared with cost estimates of mitigation and other forms of adaptation. The geographic extent of metropolitan areas is defined as their built-up areas in 2016 and come from the Atlas of Urban Expansion (http://www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org/). Percentage loss refers to (nonflooding scenario / mean of flooding scenarios) -1, where the flooding scenarios are based on RCP 4.5. Caldulations assume that the share of a city's land flooded is the same as that of the 1º by 1º cells the city belongs to. Table 4 : Population and real GDP loss in a sample of 25 large cities in 2200 damage it causes plays out over longer time periods than capital depreciation. As a result, by the time a structure becomes permanently inundated, standard depreciation would probably have required it to be rebuilt anyway. If so, the structure could simply be moved to higher ground. Second, the physical damage from flooding in large coastal cities has more to do with the loss in agglomeration economies than with the cost of the physical capital per se. As a result, the actual cost of rebuilding those structures is bound to be substantially less than their market value.
To test our intuition, we quantitatively analyze whether the paper's main insights hold when accounting for the loss in physical capital. Using data for the U.S., we perform two exercises: a first one compares the present discounted value of total losses, with and without physical capital. A second exercise traces the flooding-induced losses in the value of physical capital over time, and compares them to our earlier results.
Measuring the loss in physical structures
We start by briefly discussing how we measure the loss of physical capital over time. To be clear, we do not formally incorporate physical capital into our theoretical model. Doing so would involve introducing a rival long-lasting asset and so the associated investment decisions would require creating expectations over the future evolution of economic activity in all locations and scenarios. 12 There are no available methods to solve such a complex dynamic problem in a rich spatial setup like ours. Instead, we limit ourselves to providing a simple measurement framework to assess these losses.
Suppose the observed value of physical capital in location r in the initial period, K 0 (r), is the present discounted value of a stream of depreciated future rents in the absence of flooding given by
where δ is one minus the depreciation rate, β is the inverse of one plus a constant interest rate andk(r) is the per-period rent gross of depreciation.
The loss of initial physical capital due to flooding in location r in period t can be written as the rent net of depreciation, δ tk (r), times the share of initial land lost to permanent inundation,
The total flooding-induced loss of initial physical capital in all locations in period t is then
Dividing (11) by GDP in every period t allows us to trace the time path of the share of income lost due to the flooding of physical capital. The loss of physical capital in present discounted value terms is then simply
This calculation assumes that current valuations of physical capital do not incorporate the possibility of future flooding. That is, expression (9) assumes that today's observed market value of structures ignores future losses due to inundation. This is reasonable if either people are ignorant about future sea-level rise or if the owners of physical capital believe the government will cover the costs of future flooding. Of course, it would be straightforward to adopt the alternative assumption that the current value of physical capital incorporates future losses from inundation.
In that case, the current value of physical capital would be
where we use a prime superscript to distinguish this equation from (9) . The rest of the expressions can then be derived by analogy.
The quantitative effect of including physical structures
To quantitatively assess the impact of the loss of physical structures due to flooding, we focus on the U.S. where
we have detailed geographic data on the value of the housing stock. For each census block group, the 2006-2010
American Community Survey (ACS) from the U.S. Census Bureau gives data on the number of houses for 24 different value classes. This allows us to estimate a value for the total stock of housing at the level of census block groups. We then combine this with data on the share of land flooded at the same level of geographic resolution for each one of the 40 sea level paths under RCP 4.5 for all time periods. With these two pieces of information, we can compute the total loss in physical capital for each time period, as expressed in (11), and the present discounted value of physical capital lost, as expressed in (12) .
We start by estimating the present discounted value of losses in housing as a share of GDP. The average of these losses across the 40 sea level paths for RCP 4.5 is 0.10% of real GDP in the U.S. (95% credible interval of 0.05% -0.15%). This calculation assumes an annual depreciation rate of 2.5% (Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans, 2007) . Even if we substantially lower the depreciation rate to 1% per year, the average losses hardly increase, to 0.11% of real GDP. These estimates are based on (9), i.e., we are assuming that the current valuation of the housing stock does not incorporate future losses from flooding. If, instead, we were to assume that today's housing value already accounts for future flood damage, as in (13), then the average present discounted value of the loss in housing would increase from 0.10% of real GDP to 0.12% of real GDP in the U.S. The assessment increases since both estimations are based on the same current housing valuation observed in the data, but the latter assumes that this value already incorporates future destruction, which implies a more valuable housing stock absent flooding.
Note that, although these costs are modest, they are large relative to the present discounted value of losses without considering capital. In the U.S. the present discounted value of real GDP losses from permanent inundation when not taking into account physical structures is only 0.03%. However, as we show next, and consistent with our main argument, even these larger costs remain tiny in comparison to the cost of flooding in the absence of economic adaptation. The magnitude of our findings depends crucially on the dynamic spatial adjustment of the economy to coastal flooding. When faced with rising sea-level, people in our model have the possibility of moving to higher ground, albeit at a cost. As this occurs, the destruction of existing economic clusters is at least partly compensated by the emergence of new clusters of economic activity. The higher concentration of people in interior regions in turn enhances the incentives of local firms to innovate. When ignoring these mitigating factors, the expected real GDP loss is substantially larger. If people faced insurmountable barriers to moving when experiencing coastal flooding, the real GDP loss would be around 4.5% in the year 2200, compared to 0.11% in our model.
To lend further credibility to our findings, it is important to understand to what extent the quantitative predictions depend on the choices of some of the parameter values. To that end, Appendix B conducts extensive sensitivity analysis. As a further robustness check, Appendix C also analyzes whether the results change when using alternative sea-level rise projections and elevation data. None of these additional exercises change the paper's main conclusions. The insights of this paper also do not change when accounting for the flooding-induced damage to physical structures. Although this adds to the overall cost of sea-level rise, in the U.S. its impact is minimal relative to the mitigating effects introduced by the dynamic adaptation through migration and investment. Performing similar exercises for the rest of the world is challenging due to data limitations, but the magnitude of the differences between the role of adaptation and the role of physical capital destruction for the U.S. suggest that the conclusions for other countries are unlikely to change significantly.
Given the complexity of the issue at hand, our model necessarily leaves out some important aspects. First, although we account for the uncertainty in flooding scenarios, and we demonstrate the robustness of our evaluation to a variety of economic parameters, our evaluation does not include potential measurement error in economic variables or model misspecification. Second, we do not account for feedback loops between economic outcomes and flooding through changed emissions pathways. Third, nonlinear effects beyond those coming from agglomeration economies may aggravate the effect of flooding. Examples include partial flooding leading to contamination of freshwater supplies and the possibility of political stress and violent conflict. Fourth, we only analyze the impact of permanent, albeit gradual, inundation and not temporary flooding caused by extreme weather events. Coastal locations will likely experience increasingly frequent flooding before they fall below the high tide line, causing migration and its ensuing economic impacts to occur faster than modeled here. Finally, and conversely, we do not model efforts to mitigate flooding using a variety of methods such as barriers and dikes, which might delay migration. Future work should focus on extending our research in these directions in order to further improve our estimates of the economic consequences of coastal flooding. Figure A1 , Panels a and b, displays the losses in real GDP per capita and welfare in China. These effects are in per capita terms, and hence measure the impact on an individual resident. The mean loss in real GDP per capita due to flooding peaks at 0.94% in the year 2121, and declines thereafter. Figure A1 , Panels c and d, displays the behavior of real GDP per capita and welfare in the U.S. over the next 200 years. The overall effects are small. As the country receives flooding refugees from other countries, the spatial concentration of economic activity increases, leading to more innovation and higher GDP per capita in the long run. The welfare effects are negative though, because of the crowding out of amenities. Given the size of the country, and the high internal mobility, there is enough scope for economic adaptation. Table A1 presents the total real GDP, total welfare, and total population changes that result from flooding, as well as the peak losses in real GDP per capita and total population for all countries in our analysis. We here limit ourselves to describing the results for a few countries. In PDV terms, calculated over the period 2000 to 2200, Vietnam's total GDP drops by 7.60% because of flooding. This negative effect is due not only to the losses in real GDP per capita, but also to Vietnam's drop in total population relative to other countries. In the year 2200
A. Country Effects
Vietnam's population is 14.60% lower, compared to a world without flooding. A contrasting case is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). There the peak per capita income losses are negligible given that the country is not directly affected by flooding. However, it attracts migration from flooded areas, leading to an increase in population by around 1.79% in 2200. These gains in population imply that both total output and the total utility generated in the country increase.
B. Parameter Robustness
The quantitative results depend on the parameter values governing the forces of the economic model. These parameters were chosen as in the benchmark scenario in Desmet et al. (2018) . That paper estimates the parameters of the model using a variety of data and finds that the resulting economic model is successful in matching other, non-targeted, empirical moments. Still, there is uncertainty about the true value of these parameters. Hence, we conduct a number of robustness checks, related to the degree at which the future is discounted, the importance of mobility and trade frictions, the cost of innovation, the intensity of the spatial diffusion of technology, and the strength of production externalities and congestion. In all of them we keep the same selection of the 40 sea level paths for RCP 4.5. The results, reported in Table B1 and Table B2, demonstrate that our evaluation of the cost of permanent inundation is quite robust to changes in these parameters.
B.1 Discounting
Discounting is central to any assessment of climate change. In this subsection, we entertain the possibility of lower discount rates and Ramsey discounting. The results can be found in Panel A of Table B1 .
Discount rate. In a first robustness check, we lower the discount rate from 4% to 3%. This is the central discount rate used by the U.S. government when calculating the social cost of carbon. This parameter change increases the importance of future years in our present discounted value calculations. Giving more weight to later years increases the losses, from 0.19% to 0.26% for real GDP and from 0.24% to 0.34% for welfare. Note that the discount rate cannot fall below the equilibrium balanced growth rate in the economy which is between 2 and 3 percent depending on the scenario.
Ramsey discounting. In a second robustness check, we use time-varying Ramsey discounting. The Ramsey equation is often used in cost-benefit analysis, and relates the discount rate to the growth rate of the economy. For example, a future benefit is discounted more in a fast-growing economy than in a slow-growing economy, because of diminishing marginal utility, and a future benefit is discounted less if there is more uncertainty about future growth if agents are risk averse. As a result, in a world where future growth rates may be changing over time, the discount rate will be time-varying. To generate Ramsey discount rates for the next 200 years, we take the predicted growth path of real GDP in the no-flooding scenario, and plug this into equation (30) in Weitzman (2012) , together with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 and a rate of pure time preference of zero (so as not to favor any particular generation in the calculation of present discounted values). In the baseline quantification, our model predicts that growth rates first increase and then decline slowly to their balanced growth level, so discount rates exhibit a similar pattern. With Ramsey discounting, the predicted loss in real GDP decreases from 0.19% to 0.13%, whereas the welfare loss decreases from 0.24% to 0.14%.
B.2 Moving and trade costs
Mobility and trade are key to adaptation. In this subsection, we analyze how our results depend on mobility and trade frictions. Panel B of Table B1 reports the results.
Moving costs. We calculate counterfactual migration scenarios where we either relax or enhance existing migration frictions in the world. To allow for the possibility of different migration costs, we generalize the cost of moving by raising it to the power ϑ, so that the cost of moving to location r is m 2 (r) ϑ , where in the baseline ϑ = 1. Hence, ϑ > 1 corresponds to increasing moving costs above their current levels, whereas ϑ < 1 indicates lowering existing migration frictions. If we make it harder for people to move by increasing the moving cost parameter ϑ by 25% to 1.25, the real GDP losses from flooding increase, from 0.19% to 0.23%, because it becomes more costly to move to higher ground. In contrast, we see a slight drop in the welfare loss, from 0.24% in the benchmark to 0.22% when moving costs are higher. This occurs because greater mobility frictions imply a more disperse distribution of population. Hence, when people are forced to move because of sea-level rise, they cause less congestion in amenities in the host regions. This positive effect of lower congestion on welfare compensates the negative effect of higher moving costs on welfare. Needless to say, there is a limit to this argument. For example, in the extreme case of zero mobility, the negative effect is bound to dominate. Consistent with this, Figure 3 shows that welfare losses are up to five times larger in a world with no mobility, compared to a situation where we maintain migration frictions at their current levels. Not surprisingly, if instead of increasing the moving cost parameter, we lower ϑ by 25%
to 0.75, we see the opposite patterns. With lower migration costs, the real GDP losses drop, whereas the welfare losses show a slight increase.
Trade costs. Understanding changes in trade costs is more straightforward. We run counterfactual trade scenarios where we either increase or decrease existing transport costs. Formally, and by analogy with what we did in the case of moving costs, we raise transport costs to the power ϑ, so that the transport cost between locations r and s equals ς (r, s) ϑ , where in the baseline ϑ = 1. An increase in trade costs by 25% to ϑ = 1.25 worsens the losses from flooding, both in terms of real GDP and welfare. The PDV losses in real GDP rise from 0.19% to 0.23%, and the PDV losses in welfare rise from 0.24% to 0.26%. A drop in trade costs by 25% to ϑ = 0.75 has the opposite effect.
In this case, we see a slightly larger impact on real GDP losses, which drop to 0.14%.
B.3 Innovation and productivity
In this subsection, we analyze the sensitivity of our results to the magnitude of innovation costs, the strength of the spatial diffusion of technology, and the importance of agglomeration economies and congestion costs. Panel A of Table B2 reports the results.
Cost of innovation. We start by focusing on the fixed cost of innovation. Recall that innovating an amount φ requires a labor investment of νφ ξ . To increase or lower the cost of innovation, we raise ν to the power ϑ, where when we eliminate them. That is, we no longer assume that local density has a direct positive effect on local productivity. Since this affects the spatial concentration of economic activity both under the flooding and the non-flooding scenarios, we would probably expect the effect of inundation on real income and welfare not to change much. There is one subtle change that might potentially worsen the negative impact of flooding though. As we discussed before, in a world with production externalities, the greater geographic concentration that comes with sea-level rise partly compensates the direct negative impact of flooding on real income. By eliminating static production externalities, this mitigating effect is no longer present. However, our analysis shows that this change is quantitatively negligible: both the real income effects and the welfare effects of flooding are essentially left unchanged compared to the benchmark case.
B.4 Congestion
As a last robustness check, we increase the congestion parameter by 50%. That is, we increase the elasticity of amenities to population density by one-half, implying that local amenities suffer more from congestion than before. This reduces the incentives for people to geographically concentrate. As in the previous robustness check, the mitigating effect of the increased spatial concentration due to flooding weakens. On the other hand, higher congestion in amenities implies that less people choose to live in coastal regions, hence reducing the negative impact of coastal flooding. The results are reported in Panel B of Table B2 . The overall effect on real GDP per capita is very slight: the negative effect drops from 0.19% to 0.18%. The increase in congestion costs also has a direct impact on the utility that people derive from amenities. As a result, the greater geographic concentration that comes from land loss implies a somewhat larger negative welfare effect from flooding: in present discounted value terms, it increases from 0.24% in the benchmark to 0.29% when the congestion parameter is 50% larger.
C. Alternative Datasets on Sea-Level Rise Projections and Elevation
In this section we compare how our findings change when using alternative datasets on elevation and sea-level rise projections. For elevation, we consider JAXA's ALOS World 3D 30m mesh (AW3D30) for the entire globe. When using AW3D30 elevation data, the effects are smaller. Real GDP losses in present discounted value terms drop to 0.07%. These alternative elevation data also generate smaller displacements of the world's population:
0.46% in 2200. These smaller numbers are due to the higher positive vertical bias, compared to CoastalDEM. For completeness, Table C1 also includes an additional robustness exercise where we simultaneously use DP16 for the sea-level rise projections and AW3D30 for the elevation data.
Figures C1 through C3 display the cell-level effect on real GDP in the year 2200 using the alternative flooding projections and elevation data. The DP16 projections increase losses in coastal areas, whereas AW3D30 reduces coastal losses. These findings are confirmed in Table C2 which reports population losses in 25 major coastal cities. Calculations based on 4% annual discount rate, except in exercise 5 (discount rate 3%) and exercise 6 (Ramsey discounting based on equation (30) Calculations based on 4% annual discount rate, except in exercise 5 (discount rate 3%) and exercise 6 (Ramsey discounting based on equation (30) The geographic extent of metropolitan areas is defined as their built-up areas in 2016 and come from the Atlas of Urban Expansion (http://www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org/). Percentage loss refers to (nonflooding scenario / mean of flooding scenarios) -1, where the flooding scenarios are based on RCP 4.5. Caldulations assume that the share of a city's land flooded is the same as that of the 1º by 1º cells the city belongs to. K14 and DP16 refer to sea-level rise projections according to Kopp et al. (2014) and Kopp et al. (2017) , whereas CoastalDEM and AW3D30 refer to digital elevation models from JAXA's ALOS World 3D 30m mesh and Kulp and Strauss (2018) . The benchmark in the paper corresponds to K14 CoastalDEM. Table C2 : Population loss in a sample of 25 large cities in 2200 using alternative elevation data
